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Abstract—Right to be forgotten, also known as the right to
erasure, is the right of individuals to have their data erased from
an entity storing it. The General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) in the European Union legally solidified the status of
this long held notion. As a consequence, there is a growing need
for the development of mechanisms whereby users can verify if
service providers comply with their deletion requests.
In this work, we take the first step in proposing a formal
framework to study the design of such verification mechanisms
for data deletion requests – also known as machine unlearning –
in the context of systems that provide machine learning (ML) as
a service. We propose a backdoor-based verification mechanism
and demonstrate its effectiveness in certifying data deletion with
high confidence using the above framework. Our mechanism
makes a novel use of backdoor attacks in ML as a basis for
quantitatively inferring machine unlearning. In our mechanism,
each user poisons part of its training data by injecting a user-
specific backdoor trigger associated with a user-specific target
label. The prediction of target labels on test samples with the
backdoor trigger is then used as an indication of the user’s data
being used to train the ML model.
We formalize the verification process as a hypothesis testing
problem, and provide theoretical guarantees on the statisti-
cal power of the hypothesis test. We experimentally evaluate
our approach over a range of network architectures such as
multi-layer perceptrons (MLP), convolutional neural networks
(CNN), residual networks (ResNet), and long short-term memory
(LSTM) architectures as well as across 4 different datasets. We
experimentally demonstrate that our approach has minimal effect
on the machine learning service but provides high confidence
verification of unlearning. We show that with a 30% poison
ratio and merely 20 test queries, our verification mechanism
has both false positive and false negative ratios below 10−5.
Furthermore, we also show the effectiveness of our approach by
testing it against an adaptive adversary that uses a state-of-the-
art backdoor defense method. Overall, our approach provides
a foundation for a quantitative analysis of verifying machine
unlearning, which can provide support for legal and regulatory
frameworks pertaining to users’ data deletion requests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning models, in particular neural networks,
have achieved tremendous success in real-world applications
and have driven technology companies, such as Google,
Amazon, Microsoft, to provide machine learning as a service
(MLaaS). Under MLaaS, individual users upload personal
datasets to the server, the server then trains a ML model on the
aggregate dataset and then provides its predictive functionality
as a service to the users. However, recent works have shown
∗The first two authors contributed equally to this work.
that ML models memorize sensitive information of training
data [1–4], indicating serious privacy risks to individual user
data. At the same time, recently enacted legislation, such as the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European
Union [5] and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)
in the United States [6], recognize the consumers’ right to be
forgotten, and legally requires companies to remove a user’s
data from their systems upon the user’s deletion request.
However, there is a noticeable lack of concrete mechanisms
that enables individual users to verify compliance of their
requests. In the MLaaS setting, to satisfy the right to be for-
gotten, also known as machine unlearning, a naïve mechanism
for the server is to retrain the ML models from scratch after
removing the data pertaining to users who have requested
deletion. This naïve method becomes tedious when the dataset
is too large or the model architecture is complex to learn.
Thus, the research community has recently proposed several
approaches for increasing unlearning efficiency at the server
side either by reorganizing training data for efficient deletion
[7–9] or directly updating the model parameters to remove the
impact of the deleted data [10, 11]. We note that these works
focus on the scenario of an honest server who deletes the user
data, and do not provide any support for a mechanism to verify
machine unlearning.
In this work, we take the first step towards solving this
open problem of verified machine unlearning by individual
users in the MLaaS setting. First, we formulate the unlearning
verification problem as a hypothesis testing problem [12]
(whether the server follows requests to delete users’ data
or not) and describe the metric used to evaluate a given
verification strategy. Note that for a verifiable unlearning
strategy to be effective, it needs to satisfy two important
objectives. On one hand, the mechanism should enable each
user to leave a unique trace in the ML model after being
trained on user data, which can be leveraged in the verification
phase. On the other hand, such a unique trace needs to have
negligible impact on the model’s normal predictive behavior.
We propose a novel use of backdoor attacks in ML as our
mechanism for probabilistically verifying machine unlearning
and demonstrate how it meets the above two requirements.
In the classical backdoor attacks [13, 14], the users (adver-
saries in these settings) manipulate part of training data such
that the final trained ML model (1) returns a particular target
label as the classification on inputs that contain a backdoor
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trigger (e.g., fixed pattern of pixel values at certain positions
in the image) and (2) provides normal prediction in the
absence of the trigger. In our machine unlearning verification
mechanism, we extend a backdoor proposed by Gu et al. [13].
In our approach, each user first randomly chooses its backdoor
trigger and the associated target label, then adds the trigger to
a fraction of training samples (poisoning) and sets their labels
as the target label, and finally provides the poisoned dataset to
the MLaaS server. We demonstrate that the ML model trained
on such data has a high backdoor success rate (i.e., target label
classification in the presence of the trigger) for every user’s
backdoor trigger and target label pair. When the user later asks
the MLaaS provider to delete its data, it can verify whether
the provider deleted its data from the ML model by checking
the backdoor success rate using its own backdoor trigger with
the target label. If the model has a low backdoor success rate,
the user can infer that the server followed the deletion request;
otherwise, the server did not follow the deletion request.
Furthermore, we theoretically quantify the performance of
our backdoor-based verification mechanism under the pro-
posed formulation of hypothesis testing [12]. We experi-
mentally evaluate our proposed techniques over 4 popular
datasets – EMNIST, FEMNIST, CIFAR10, and AGNews and 4
different neural network architectures – multi-layer perception
(MLP), convolution neural network (CNN), residual network
(ResNet), long short-term memory (LSTM). We show that our
mechanism has excellent performance – using 30% poisoned
samples and merely 20 test queries achieves both false positive
and false negative value below 10−5. We also evaluate the
mechanism under an adaptive malicious server, one which uses
the state-of-the-art backdoor defense techniques to decrease
the backdoor attack accuracy. We find that such a server can
lower the backdoor success rate, especially for a low poisoning
ratio, but the backdoor success rates are still significant enough
to validate unlearning with high confidence. Our contributions
can be briefly summarized as follows:
(1) Machine Unlearning Verification Formulation: We
provide a rigorous framework for compliance verification
of right to be forgotten requests by individual users, in the
context of machine learning systems. We formalize this as
a hypothesis test between an honest server following the
deletion request and a malicious server arbitrarily deviat-
ing from the prescribed deletion. Our metric, the power
of the hypothesis test, quantifies the confidence a user
has in knowing that the service provider complied with
its data deletion request. Our framework is applicable to
a wide range of MLaaS systems.
(2) Proposed Unlearning Verification Mechanism: We pro-
pose a backdoor-based mechanism for probabilistically
verifying unlearning and show its effectiveness in the
above framework. We provide a thorough mathematical
analysis of our proposed mechanism. Theorem 1, infor-
mally stated, enables a user to find out the number of test
samples required to achieve high confidence in verifying
its deletion request. We also provide methods for individ-
ual users to estimate parameters and necessary statistics
for high confidence detection of non-compliance.
(3) Extensive Evaluation: Finally, we perform a thorough
empirical evaluation of our proposed mechanism. We
consider 4 different datasets – EMNIST, FEMNIST, CI-
FAR10, AG News – 3 image datasets and 1 text dataset.
We also study the mechanism over 4 different model
architectures – MLP, CNN, ResNet, and LSTM. We quan-
titatively measure the high confidence of our backdoor-
based verification mechanism, and show that it remains
effective for an adaptive malicious server who uses state-
of-the-art backdoor defense to mitigate backdoor attacks.
We also study the heterogeneity in performance across
different users, show how the verification confidence in
worst-case scenarios can be improved through collabora-
tion among users, and provide bounds on the numbers of
users sustainable by our approach.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Deep Neural Networks
Neural networks are a class of algorithms that enable auto-
matic learning of certain tasks through sample data performing
the task successfully. These algorithms derive their name as
they try to mimic the workings of biological neural networks
such as the human brain. With increased computational power,
modern neural networks operate on large amounts of data and
with millions of configurable parameters. Due to the immense
complexity of the non-convex parameter space, the learning of
parameters is not optimized globally, but in an iterative fashion
trained with data split in mini-batches using the stochastic
gradient descent algorithm and its variants [15, 16]. Over
the years, various network architectures have been proposed
that have shown promise in different target applications –
multilayer perceptrons [17], convolutional networks [18], and
residual networks [19] that have achieved tremendous success
in computer vision, long short-term memory (LSTM) archi-
tectures [20] for applications in natural language processing.
B. Backdoor Attacks and Defenses
In a backdoor attack, the adversary maliciously augments
training samples with a hidden trigger into the training process
of the target deep learning model such that when the backdoor
trigger is added to any test input, the model will output a spe-
cific target label. Compared to data poisoning attacks which
cause intentional misclassifications on clean test samples via
training set manipulations, backdoor attacks only alter the
model’s predictions in presence of the backdoor trigger and
behave normally on clean samples.
In our work, we build upon the attack of Gu et al. [13].
For a subset of the training samples, their attack chooses
a backdoor pattern (fixed pixels and their color/brightness),
applies this pattern to the samples, and changes the labels to
the target backdoor label. During the training process with
the full dataset, the target model finally learns to associate
the backdoor trigger with the target label. Recent works
have improved this approach [14, 21], extended it to transfer
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learning [22], and avoided alteration of the original labels of
poison samples [23, 24]. We note that the search for even better
backdoor attacks is orthogonal to the goals of our paper.
In parallel, defence mechanisms against backdoor attacks
have been explored as well. Wang et al. [25] introduced
Neural Cleanse, a backdoor detection and mitigation mech-
anism that we use in our work. For each possible label,
the approach searches for candidate backdoor trigger patterns
using optimization procedures. If at least one of the reverse-
engineered patterns is small enough, Neural Cleanse concludes
that the model suffers from a backdoor. Then, three mitigation
techniques are applied. First, Neural Cleanse filters out test
samples with similar neuron activation patterns as the reversed
trigger. Second, Neural Cleanse prunes the neurons which
have significant activations only on samples with reversed
trigger. However, these two methods suffer from adaptive
attacks [26]. In the third approach, Neural Cleanse adds the
reversed trigger to some known clean training samples and
then fine-tunes the model with those samples along with
correct labels. Other recent works on mitigating backdoor
attacks analyze neuron activation patterns [27–29], remove
training samples based on computed outlier scores [30], and
reconstruct the backdoor [29]. However, strategic backdoor
attacks with adaptive considerations of these defences can
significantly mitigate their performance [26, 27, 31].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formalize a framework to study machine
unlearning in the context of MLaaS. Specifically, we consider
the following scenario illustrated in Figure 1a: Users interact
with a server who provides machine learning as a service.
Users who request the removal of their data from the training
set of a machine learning service have no guarantee currently
that their data was actually removed. Thus, there is an impor-
tant need to uncover a strategy that can verify if user data
was used in the generation of a machine learning model1.
We formalize a framework to study the effectiveness of such
machine unlearning verification strategies.
a) Notation: Let U denote the set of all users and u ∈ U
denote a particular user. Let s ∈ S denote a specific strategy
used by the users to verify whether the server deletes its data
following the deletion request2 where S denotes the space of
all possible users strategies. Furthermore, let A ∈ A denote the
model training algorithm used by the server where A denotes
the set of all possible algorithms that can be used by the server.
For generality, we consider that such a service allows for
multiple requests. We assume that the users use MLaaS while
injecting a few test service requests (denoted by n) which
will be used to detect server malintent. We then formulate the
effectiveness of such machine unlearning verification strategies
using hypothesis testing.
1Note that given the difficult of verifying local computations on the server,
it is difficult to infer directly if the data was used in the training set or not.
2We restrict our analysis to a single strategy, with local randomness, used
by all the users.
b) Hypothesis Testing: We define the null hypothesis H0
to be the state when server deletes the user data and the
alternative hypothesis H1 to be the state when the server does
not delete the data. We define the Type I errors as α (false
positive) and Type II errors as β (false negative) given below:
α = Pr [Reject H0 |H0 is true]
β = Pr [Accept H0 |H1 is true]
(1)
We define the effectiveness of a verification strategy s for
a given server algorithm A for a given acceptable tolerance
of Type I error (α) to be the power of the hypothesis test
formulated above, i.e.,
ρA,α(s, n) = (1− β)
= 1− Pr [Accept H0|H1is true]
(2)
Informally speaking, ρ quantifies the confidence the user has
that the server has deleted their data. This deletion confidence
(1 − β), the power of the hypothesis test, is the probability
that we detect the alternative hypothesis when the alternative
hypothesis is true. On the other hand, α refers to the acceptable
value of the server being falsely accused of malicious activity
when in practice it follows the data deletion honestly. For a
given value of n, α and β cannot be simultaneously reduced
and hence we usually set an acceptable value of α and then
(1− β) quantifies the effectiveness of the test.
IV. OUR FRAMEWORK
Verified machine unlearning is in general very hard given
that the data has already been outsourced to another party. Spe-
cific to the context of machine-learning-as-a-service (MLaaS),
how does one verify if the model is trained on a particular
user’s data or not? One possible approach is enabled by
membership inference attacks such as Shokri et al. [2] or
the approach by Song and Shmatikov [32]. However, this
line of work suffers from a number of limitations – low
accuracy due to the training data not being actively perturbed,
extensive knowledge of the MLaaS model’s architecture for
white-box attack variants, access to auxiliary or shadow data
and computational power in an extent similar to the MLaaS
provider – all of which limit the feasibility of such approaches
for our problem setting.
Threat Model and Assumptions: We aim to distinguish the
scenario of an honest server who follows the data unlearning
protocol from that of a dishonest server who can arbitrarily
deviate from the protocol. In particular, we consider two
specific models for the server in the latter case – both do not
delete the data, but the first is non-adaptive and expects to not
get detected, while the second is adaptive and employs state-
of-the-art defense mechanisms to mitigate user strategies and
to evade detection. We run our evaluation on both, adaptive
and non-adaptive, server algorithms. Our approach requires
only black-box prediction access to the MLaaS provider’s
model. However, the provider is not able to determine which
user is querying the trained machine learning model. This
can be achieved using of-the-shelf anonymous communication
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(a) The first step involves the backdoor injec-
tion during model training.
(b) When the server deletes the user’s data
(H0), the predictions of backdoor samples are
correct labels with high probability.
(c) When the server does not delete the user’s
data (H1), the predictions of backdoor sam-
ples are target labels with high probability.
Fig. 1: (Overall system operation.) First, users inject backdoor samples over which the server trains the model. At a later stage,
users leverage model predictions on backdoored test samples to detect whether the server followed their deletion requests or
not – as shown by the difference between Figure 1b and Figure 1c.
schemes like [33, 34]. Finally, we note that the scope of our
approach is limited to validating if users’ data was deleted
from a specific machine learning model exposed by the MLaaS
provider, and does not include validating deletion from other
computing or storage resources at the provider.
Our Approach: In order to enable such a system for
verifying machine unlearning, we propose an approach that
leverages the users’ ability to inject stealthy backdoors into
their data. In particular, each user modifies their data locally
using a private backdoor that is only known to them. If the
MLaaS provider trains the model on such data, the backdoor
can help the user detect maliciously dismissed data deletion
requests as the models trained on the poisoned data (the
data which contains such private backdoors) provide different
predictions on very specific samples compared to models
trained on data without poisoning. Compared to prior work on
backdoors (cf. Section II), we propose and analyze a multi-user
scenario where each user is employing an individual backdoor.
For such a system to work well, it is imperative that there
exists a statistically significant distinguishing test between
models trained with vs without the backdoored user’s data.
At the same time, the backdoored data should have minimal
impact on the model’s normal performance. Figure 1 shows
our approach and can be described in two phases as follows:
Phase I
(1) The users generate individual backdoor patterns that alter
the predictions of samples to a fixed label.
(2) Users apply their backdoor patterns to a fraction of their
data, submit that to the MLaaS provider, and the provider
trains a ML model on the data.
(3) Each user can run confirmation tests to collect statistics
on their backdoor.
Phase II
(1) Some users request a deletion of their data. The server
then either retrains the model complying with these
requests or proceeds maliciously.
(2) The users query model with n backdoored samples and
based on the predictions try to infer if the server complied
with their request or not.
In our evaluation (Section VI), we apply a backdoor using
the method described in Section II-B, i.e, setting 4 user-
specific pixel or words to a dataset dependent value and
changing the label to a user-specific target label. Note that the
success of altering the prediction using backdoored samples is
usually not guaranteed every single time but in a probabilistic
manner. Thus, the decision on whether the data has been
deleted or not is determined by a hypothesis test. For an
effective backdoor algorithm, when the model was trained on
backdoored data, the probability of receiving the target label
in presence of the backdoor pattern, i.e., backdoor success
rate, should be high. At the same time, when the provider has
deleted the user’s data (the model has not been trained on the
user’s backdoored samples), the backdoor success rate should
be low. In this way the hypothesis test can distinguish between
the two scenarios. Throughout this paper, the two probabilities
corresponding to backdoor attack accuracy for deleted data
and undeleted data are referred to as q (lower), and p (higher)
respectively. Furthermore, the confidence of this test increases
with n, the number of backdoored test samples a user queries
the trained ML model with. Thus our verification mechanism
can be used to detect missing deletion with high confidence
by increasing the number of test samples.
Given that estimation of p and q is central to the detection of
non-compliance, we describe the approach from an individual
user perspective below.
Estimating p: A user can obtain an estimate pˆ by querying
the model with backdoored samples, immediately after the
model has been trained with its data. At this moment, a user
can determine whether the backdoor strategy is working. If the
resulting pˆ is close to the random prediction baseline, either
the applied backdoor strategy s is not working, or its data has
not been used in training. However, if pˆ is significantly higher
than the baseline, our strategy s can work well and we can
use pˆ as an estimate.
Estimating q: There are two ways of obtaining an estimate
qˆ: If the algorithm can be queried before the user provides
its data, qˆ can be obtained by querying the algorithm using
samples with the user’s backdoor the algorithm has not seen
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before. If this is not possible, the user can estimate qˆ by
applying another random backdoor pattern to its data and
querying the algorithm. The output should be similar to the
case where the algorithm has never seen the user’s legitimate
backdoor pattern.
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we theoretically analyze the confidence of
our hypothesis test. The confidence, expressed by the metric
ρA,α(s, n), is based on a hypothesis test where two cases are
compared: H0 – the data has been deleted, and H1 – the
data has not been deleted. We measure the Type II error β
which denotes the probability that the server evades detection,
i.e., the server behaves malicious but is not caught. Note that
this requires we set a level of acceptable Type I error α, i.e.,
the probability that we falsely accuse the server of avoiding
deletion. Hence, the metric ρA,α(s, n) = 1 − β is a function
of the backdoor strategy s and the number of predictions on
backdoored test samples n for a given MLaaS server A and a
value of Type I error α. We structure the section as follows:
(A) Basic Hypothesis Testing: First we set-up the basics
of hypothesis testing for our scenario and introduce the
required notation.
(B) Estimating Deletion Confidence: Next, we show how to
compute the metric ρA,α(s, n) for a given Type I error
α. This can be reduced to the following steps:
• Compute the optimal value of the threshold t for a
given value of α, the Type I error
• Compute the value of β, the Type II error, for the given
optimal threshold t
• Compute ρA,α(s, n) from the previously computed β
(C) Relaxing Assumptions: Our theoretical analysis is based
on prior knowledge of statistics defining the hypotheses
H0 and H1. Next, we outline strategies for users to
estimate these statistics, and theoretically quantify the
impact of the estimation on our system.
A. Basic Hypothesis Testing
We query the ML-mechanism A with n backdoored samples
{samplei}ni=1 of a single user and measure how often the ML-
mechanism does classify the samples as the desired target
label, denoted as Targeti. Then, the measured success rate is
rˆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
{
1 if A(samplei) = Targeti
0 otherwise
(3)
Furthermore, we define two important quantities, q, p that
quantify the probability that the prediction on backdoored
samples is equal to the target label for the null hypothesis
vs the alternative hypothesis.
q = Pr [A(samplei) = Targeti |H0 is true]
p = Pr [A(samplei) = Targeti |H1 is true]
(4)
Note that the measure rˆ approaches q if the null hypothesis H0
(data was deleted) is true and approaches p if the alternative
hypothesis H1 (data was not deleted) is true. To decide
whether we are in H0 or H1, we define a threshold t and
if rˆ ≤ t we output H0 else output H1. The false-positive
error α and false-negative error β are the respective leftover
probability masses that we have decided wrongly. This is
illustrated in Figure 2a.
The threshold t is set according to the desired properties of
the hypothesis test. As common in statistics, t is set based on
a small value of α (also known as p-value), the probability
that we falsely accuse the ML-provider of dismissal of our
data deletion request.
B. Estimating Deletion Confidence
To derive an analytic expression for ρA,α(s, n), we note
that the order in which we request the prediction of back-
doored samples does not matter. Moreover, we assume that
the ML provider returns the correct target prediction label
with probability q for users with fulfilled deletion requests,
and p otherwise. Further, we assume that the ML provider is
not aware which user is querying. Else, the provider could
run user specific evasion strategies, e.g., having for each user
a unique model with only the user’s data excluded. This can,
for example, be achieved by an anonymous communication
channel. Since the user strategy is completely defined by the
the two parameters q, p, we will often interchangeably express
a strategy s for these cases by s = (q, p).
First, we show that the occurrence probability of a user-
measured average backdoor success ratio rˆ follows a bino-
mial distribution with abscissa rescaled to [0,1] with mean q
(deleted), or p (not deleted) respectively. Then, we compute the
Type II error β based on the Type I error α that results from
the overlap of these two binomial distributions. Finally, we
derive an analytic expression for the verification confidence:
Theorem 1. For a given ML-mechanism A and a given
acceptable Type I error probability α, the deletion confidence
ρA,α(s, n) is given by the following expression:
ρA,α(s, n) = 1−
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k·
H
[
k∑
l=0
(
n
l
)
ql(1− q)n−l ≤ 1− α
] (5)
where p, q are as given by Equation (4) and H(·) is the heavy-
side step function, i.e., H(x) = 1 if x is True and 0 otherwise.
Theorem 1 gives a closed-form expression to compute the
backdoor success probability as a function of the various
system parameters. To prove the above result, we rely on the
independence of prediction order assumption. We define a test
of the backdoor success of n consecutive samples as follows:
Definition 1. Given oracle access to the predictions on n
samples {samplei}ni=1, for r ∈ [0, 1], we define Testn,r as a
random variable that returns a value in {0, 1}n where each
entry is 1 with probability r and 0 with probability 1 − r
assuming the order of the predictions is immaterial and that
they are processed independently.
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(a) The relation between the threshold t, and the Type I error α and
Type II error β for number of measured samples n = 5.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
measured backdoor success rate rˆ
re
la
ti
v
e
o
c
c
u
rr
e
n
c
e
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
n = 5
n = 10
n = 20
(b) With additional number of measured samples n, the distributions
concentrate around the mean, thus simultaneously decreasing both
α and β. Height of curves are adjusted for demonstration purposes.
Fig. 2: Intuitive illustration on the ability to distinguish the binomial probability mass distributions belonging to the hypotheses
H0 and H1, for q = 0.1 and p = 0.8.
If r is set to the backdoor success probability p or q, then the
above defined Testn,r mimics the output of the corresponding
ML-mechanism as it effectively measures the ratio of cases
where a backdoor was able to change the prediction of its
sample to a target label. Hence, for the hypothesis test, it is
sufficient to compare the backdoor success ratio p where the
backdoor works (data not deleted) to the case where it does
not work (data deleted) with ratio q. Next, we prove that the
random variable rˆ follows a rescaled binomial distribution.
Lemma 1 (Measured backdoor success rate). Let n ∈ N. Let
o ∈ {0, 1}n be a random draw from Testn,r with r ∈ [0, 1],
the following statements hold:
(1) The random variable rˆ = 1n
∑n
j=1 oj follows a binomial
distribution with abscissa scaled to [0, 1] with draws n
and success probability r where oj is the jth draw output
of o. We call rˆ the discrete success rate probability.
(2) The standard-deviation of rˆ shrinks as O( 1√
n
)
(3) The tail probability mass of rˆ can be computed for
x ∈ [0, 1] using the following relation (and a symmetric
relation for rˆ ≤ x):
Pr[rˆ ≥ x] =
n∑
k≥n·x
(
n
k
)
rk(1− r)n−k (6)
Proof. As we assumed the independence of prediction or-
der, the output of Testn,r follows a binomial distribution
binom (n, r) where n is the number of draws and r is the
success probability.
(1) For k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, let Ck be the set of all possible out-
puts c of Testn,r with
∑n
j=0 cj = k. Note that all outputs
are equally likely. Then, the occurrence probability for
rˆ = kn is given by:
Pr[rˆ =
k
n
] =
∑
∀c∈Ck
rk(1− r)n−k
=
(
n
k
)
rk(1− r)n−k
= Pr
binom
[k = k|n, r]
(7)
(2) The variance of a binomial distribution is σ2n = nr(1 −
r). With scaled abscissa by 1/n, the standard deviation
becomes σ =
√
σ2n/n
2 =
√
r(1− r)/√n.
(3) The mass in the tail is the sum over the probabilities
for the corresponding discrete events. Hence Equation (6)
directly follows from summing Equation (7) for k ≥ n ·x
Proof of Theorem 1. Lemma 1 can be directly applied to
prove the results in Theorem 1. In particular, the hypothesis
test consists of distinguishing two scaled binomial distributions
with r = q in case H0 (the data has been deleted) and r = p
for H1 (data has not been deleted). Figure 2a graphically illus-
trates this while Figure 2b demonstrates the effect of multiple
samples on the scaled distributions. As seen in Lemma 1,
the scaled distributions concentrate around the mean, thus
reducing the probability in the overlapped areas, which in
effect reduces the Type I and Type II error probabilities.
By Lemma 1, the shape of the hypothesis distriubtions
depens on q for H0 and p for H1. Therefore, for a given
a threshold t ∈ [0, 1], the Type I error αt and the Type II error
βt for the hypothesis test depend on p and q respectively.
αtq = Pr[rˆ > t|H0, n]
=
n∑
k>n·t
(
n
k
)
qk(1− q)n−k (8a)
βtp = Pr[rˆ ≤ t|H1, n]
=
n·t∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k (8b)
Given that α is set by systemic constraints, we invert
Equation (8a) to get the optimal value of the threshold t
and then plug that into Equation (8b). Consider the following
equality defining tα given α:
H
[
k
n
≤ tα
]
:= H
[
Pr
[
rˆ ≤ k
n
∣∣∣H0, n] ≤ 1− α] (9)
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We can then use this implicit definition of threshold tα to
determine the Type II error β given a value of p:
βαp,q=
n∑
k=0
Pr
[
rˆ =
k
n
∣∣∣H1, n]· H[k
n
≤ tα
]
=
n∑
k=0
Pr
[
rˆ =
k
n
∣∣∣H1, n]· H[Pr [rˆ ≤ k
n
∣∣∣H0, n] ≤ 1−α]
=
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1−p)n−k · H
[
k∑
l=0
(
n
l
)
ql(1−q)n−l ≤ 1−α
]
Finally, to connect this value with ρA,α(s, n), we use Equa-
tion (2) from Section III and s = (p, q):
ρA,α(s, n) = 1− βαp,q
= 1−
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k·
H
[
k∑
l=0
(
n
l
)
ql(1− q)n−l ≤ 1− α
] (10)
which gives us an analytic expression for the confidence that
we are in case H1, i.e. that our data has not been deleted as
requested. If this value is high, the user has high confidence
that the server does not follow deletion request.
C. Relaxing Assumptions: Single User Perspective
In our theoretical analysis above, we have assumed to know
p and q perfectly. In a real-world setup, these values are always
measurements. While a machine learning service provider has
the ability to quantify p and q accurately on a lot of samples,
single users that want to verify the deletion of their data do
usually not have this kind of opportunity. They need to work
with vague estimates pˆ and qˆ obtained on a low number of
samples n as described in Section IV.
We observe that if we overestimate qˆ with a bound qˆ′ and
underestimate pˆ with a bound pˆ′, then the metric ρA,α(s, n)
provides a lower bound, i.e., the confidence guarantees given
by ρ do not worsen if the distance between qˆ and pˆ increases.
ρA,α(s = (qˆ
′, pˆ′), n) ≤ ρA,α(s = (qˆ, pˆ), n) (11)
with qˆ ≤ qˆ′ and pˆ ≥ pˆ′. This comes from the fact that for a
given α the overlap of the two scaled binomial distribution
decreases when they are moved further apart, and thereby
decreasing the β which in terms defines ρ.
Alternatively, users can assume priors for p and q, apply
Bayes’ theorem, and compute ρA,α as the expectation over all
possible p and q:
Pr[r|rˆ, n] = Pr[rˆ|r, n] Pr[r]
Pr[rˆ|n] (12)
for r ∈ {q, p} given an estimation rˆ ∈ {qˆ, pˆ}. (Pr[rˆ|n] =∑
r Pr[rˆ|r, n].) Then
ρA,α(s = (qˆ, pˆ), n) = EPr[q|qˆ,n],Pr[p|pˆ,n] [ρA,α(s = (q, p), n)]
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe our experimental setup,
then present the performance of our verification frame-
work for both non-adaptive server and adaptive server. Our
code is publicly available at https://github.com/inspire-group/
unlearning-verification.
A. Experimental setup
Pipeline for machine unlearning verification. The first part
of our evaluation examines the distinguishability of backdoor
success rates for data owner whose data has been deleted by a
benevolent MLaaS provider versus the case where the provider
has maliciously avoided deletion. First, for each user of the
datasets described below, a fraction of its training samples are
equipped with a user specific and dataset dependent backdoor,
i.e., 4 random pixels or words are overwritten and their labels
are set to a user specific target label. After training the
model with the partially backdoored dataset, we compute the
backdoor success rate for each user’s backdoor trigger with
its target label, formerly denoted by p in Equation (4). Then,
we compute the same success probability on a part of the
users that have been excluded before training, introduced as q
in Equation (4). Finally, we illustrate the decreasing average
Type-II error β (cf. Equation (1)) for a range of number of
measurements n for different values of Type-I error α, leading
to an increasing average deletion confidence ρA,α(s, n).
As MLaaS providers can defend against backdoor attacks,
we illustrate the success of our approach in a comparison
of a non-adaptive MLaaS provider that does not implement
adaptive defences to an adaptive provider that implements
state-of-the-art defence Neural Cleanse [25] (cf. Section II-B).
Moreover, we evaluate the performance for different models
with varying complexity.
Optimally, such an evaluation excludes each user individ-
ually from the full dataset and then retrains the model for
each exclusion again from scratch. Due to computation power
restrictions, we separated 20% of the available users before
training, and trained the models on the leftover 80% of the
users. Note that our approach is applicable and effective even
when a small number of users request data deletion. We
exclude 20% of users to obtain a reliable estimation of the
performance of our verification mechanism. Therefore, the first
20% of users were not included in any training and act in the
evaluation as users that have requested the deletion of their
data (H0). We call them “deleted users”. In contrast, we have
split remaining users’ data into a training and a test set (80%
samples are in training set, and remaining 20% samples are in
test set). We trained the model on the training set. The test set
was used to evaluate the case where the users’ data was not
deleted (H1). Accordingly, we call them “undeleted users”.
Following paragraphs describe evaluated datasets, ML ar-
chitectures and backdoor methods, summarized in Table I.
Extended MNIST (EMNIST). The dataset is composed of
handwritten character digits derived from the NIST Special
Database 19 [35]. The input images are in black-and-white
with a size of 28× 28 pixels. In our experiments, we use the
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TABLE I: Summary of dataset details and model performance without backdoors.
Dataset Details ML Model
Name sample number of number of number of model train acc. test acc.dimension classes total samples total users architecture (no backdoor) (no backdoor)
EMNIST 28× 28 10 280,000 1,000 MLP 99.84% 98.99%
FEMNIST 28× 28 10 382,705 3,383 CNN 99.72% 99.45%
CIFAR10 32× 32× 3 10 60,000 500 ResNet 98.98% 91.03%
AG News 15–150 words 4 549,714 580 LSTM 96.87% 91.03%
TABLE II: Summary of our backdoor-based verification performance for both non-adaptive and adaptive servers, where p is
the backdoor success rate of undeleted users, and q is the backdoor success rate of deleted users. We provide the Type-II error
(β) of our verification mechanism with 20 test samples and α as 10−5. We find that the adaptive server with Neural Cleanse
can greatly reduce the backdoor success of the MLP model trained on EMNIST dataset, leading to β = 0.93. However, when
using CNN architecture to train a EMNIST classifier, the defense of Neural Cleanse is limited, and we reduce β to 6.6×10−12.
Target model Non-adaptive server (30% poison ratio) Adaptive server (30% poison ratio)
Name backdoor method benign test acc p q β benign test acc p q β
EMNIST (MLP) set 4 random pixels to be 1 98.30% 93.64% 9.56% 6.8× 10−9 98.69% 31.92% 10.00% 0.93
EMNIST (CNN) set 4 random pixels to be 1 99.33% 99.48% 10.17% 1.2× 10−20 99.33% 96.69% 9.28% 6.6× 10−12
FEMNIST set 4 random pixels to be 0 99.41% 99.98% 10.30% 3.2× 10−37 99.27% 96.26% 10.53% 7.0× 10−10
CIFAR10 set 4 random pixels to be 1 88.00% 96.93% 8.43% 3.0× 10−12 88.00% 90.54% 7.88% 3.1× 10−8
AG News replace 4 out of last 15 words 90.50% 99.95% 26.68% 6.6× 10−16 Not Applicable
digits form of EMNIST, which has 10 class labels, each with
280,000 samples [36]. We split the dataset into 1,000 users
in an independent and identically distributed (IID) manner,
with 280 samples per user. For the model architecture, we use
a multi-layer perceptron (MLP), which contains three layers
with 512, 512, and 10 neurons. Using the Adam optimizer
[16], we train the model with 20 epochs and a batch size of
128. On a clean dataset, the model achieves 99.84% training
accuracy and 98.99% test accuracy. For the backdoor method,
each user chooses a random target label and a backdoor trigger
by randomly selecting 4 pixels and setting their values as 1.
Federated Extended MNIST (FEMNIST). The dataset aug-
ments Extended MNIST by providing a writer ID [37]. We also
use the digits, containing 10 class labels and 382,705 samples
from 3,383 users, rendering it IID due to the unique writing
style of each person. Same as EMNIST, the input image is in
black-and-white with 28×28 pixels. Different from EMNIST,
this dataset does not include additional preprocessing, such
as size-normalization and centering. Also, the pixel value is
inverse: the value of 1.0 corresponds to the background, and
0.0 corresponds to the digits. Therefore, we use the same
backdoor method as for EMNIST, but setting the pixels to 0
instead of 1. For the model architecture, we use a convolutional
neural network (CNN), containing two convolutional layers
with 3×3 kernel size and filter numbers of 32 and 64, followed
by two fully connected layers, containing 512 and 10 neurons.
We use the Adam optimizer [16] to train the model with 20
epochs and batch size of 128. Without backdooring, the model
achieves 99.72% training accuracy and 99.45% test accuracy.
CIFAR10. Providing 32× 32× 3 color images in 10 classes,
with 6,000 samples per class, we split this dataset in into
500 users in an IID manner, 120 samples per user. Applying
a residual network (ResNet) [19], containing 3 groups of
residual layers with number of filters set to (16, 32, 64), and 3
residual units for each group, and using Adam [16] for training
with with 200 epochs and batch size of 32, this model achieves
98.98% training accuracy and 91.03% test accuracy on a
clean dataset without backdoors. To achieve good accuracy
performance, we use standard data augmentation methods
(e.g., shift, flip). The backdoor method is identical to EMNIST.
Note that we consider RGB channels as different pixels.
AG News. This is a major benchmark dataset for text classi-
fication [38]. The raw dataset [39] contains 1, 281, 104 news
articles from more than 2, 000 news sources (users). Similar
to Zhang et al. [38], we choose the 4 largest news categories
(Business, Sci/Tech, Sports, World) as class labels and use the
title and description fields of the news to predict its category.
We filter out samples with less than 15 words and only
keep users with more than 30 samples to improve statistical
evaluation reliability. The final dataset has 549, 714 samples
from 580 users. For the model architecture, we use a long
short-term memory (LSTM) network [20]. The model first
turn words into 100-dimension vectors, and then uses a LSTM
layer with 100 units to learn feature representations, and finally
a linear layer with 4 neurons for classification. We use the
Adam optimizer [16] to train the model with 5 epochs and
batch size of 64. Without backdooring, the model achieves
96.87% training accuracy and 91.03% test accuracy. For the
backdoor method, each user chooses a random target label and
a backdoor pattern by randomly picking 4 word positions in
last 15 words and replacing them with 4 user-specific words,
which are randomly chosen from the whole word vocabulary.
B. Results for the non-adaptive server
We first present the evaluation results for the non-adaptive
server, where the server uses the non-adaptive learning algo-
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(a) Model accuracy and backdoor success rate
for EMNIST classifiers3.
(b) Verification performance for EMNIST
classifiers with different poison ratios.
(c) Verification performance for the EMNIST
classifier with different α.
(d) Model accuracy and backdoor success
rate for FEMNIST classifiers3.
(e) Verification performance for FEMNIST
classifiers with different poison ratios.
(f) Verification performance for the FEM-
NIST classifier with different α.
(g) Model accuracy and backdoor success
rate for CIFAR10 classifiers3.
(h) Verification performance for CIFAR10
classifiers with different poison ratios.
(i) Verification performance for the CIFAR10
classifier with different α.
(j) Model accuracy and backdoor success rate
for AG News classifiers.
(k) Verification performance for AG News
classifiers with different poison ratios.
(l) Verification performance for the AG News
classifier with different α.
Fig. 3: Our backdoor-based machine unlearning verification results with a non-adaptive server on the EMNIST dataset (the
first row), the FEMNIST dataset (the second row), the CIFAR10 dataset (the third row), and the AG News dataset (the last
row). We present the model accuracy and backdoor success rate in the first column, the verification performance with Type-I
error α = 10−5 in the second column, and the verification performance with a poison ratio of 30% in the third column.
rithm to train the ML model. On each dataset, we compute
the backdoor success rate for each individual, and compute
the undeleted users’ average success rate p and deleted users’
average success rate as q to evaluate the performance of
our machine unlearning verification method with different
numbers n of test queries, following Theorem 1.
First, our verification mechanism works well with high
confidence on the EMNIST dataset. From Figure 3a, we can
see that the attack accuracy for undeleted users (p) increases
with the poison ratio, while the attack accuracy for deleted
users (q) stays around 10% (random guess accuracy). At the
same time, poison ratios as high as 60% have negligible impact
on model accuracy for clean test samples. Besides plotting
the average accuracy across users, we also show the 25%–
75% quantile ranges for individual users’ accuracy values3,
examined in more detail in Section VII. Figure 3b shows that
a higher poison ratio also leads to a lower Type-II error in our
verification mechanism due to a larger gap between p and q,
therefore increasing the confidence in distinguishing between
H0 and H1. We further show the verification performance with
different tolerances on the Type-I error (α) in Figure 3c by
fixing the poison ratio at 30%.
Given a Type I error α and a fixed number of test samples n,
3 While for most deleted users the backdoors success ratio is almost 0, for
a few it is close to 1. This leads to the paradox fact that the average value is
above the colored 25%-75% quantile range.
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(a) Model accuracy and backdoor success rate
for EMNIST classifiers.
(b) Verification performance for EMNIST
classifiers with different poison ratios.
(c) Verification performance for the EMNIST
classifier with different α.
(d) Model accuracy and backdoor success
rate for FEMNIST classifiers.
(e) Verification performance for FEMNIST
classifiers with different poison ratios.
(f) Verification performance for the FEM-
NIST classifier with different α.
(g) Model accuracy and backdoor success
rate for CIFAR10 classifiers3.
(h) Verification performance for CIFAR10
classifiers with different poison ratios.
(i) Verification performance for the CIFAR10
classifier with different α.
Fig. 4: Our backdoor-based machine unlearning verification results with an adaptive server on the EMNIST dataset (the first
row), the FEMNIST dataset (the second row), and the CIFAR10 dataset (the third row).We present the model accuracy and
backdoor success rate in the first column, the verification performance with Type-I error α = 10−5 in the second column, and
the verification performance with a poison ratio of 30% in the third column.
the computation of the corresponding type II error β is discrete
as the corresponding rescaled binomial distribution is discrete
and therefore the probability mass in the tails usually does
not sum up exactly to α (cf. Section V). This property leads
to jumps when plotting β over different n as the probability
mass of a discrete event might not be included in the tail with
maximal size α anymore, and be added to β instead. This is
the case for all plots, not only for Figure 3b and Figure 3c.
Second, our verification mechanism generalizes to more
complex image datasets. Figure 3d to Figure 3f and Figure 3g
to Figure 3i present the accuracy performance and the verifi-
cation performance for the non-IID FEMNIST dataset and the
CIFAR10 dataset, respectively. Similar to EMNIST, the gap
between p and q becomes larger when increasing the poison
ratio. The only exception is that the CIFAR10 classifier has a
much lower p value with 90% poison ratio along with a low
accuracy on the clean samples. Furthermore, our verification
mechanism achieves more confidence on those two datatsets
than the EMNIST dataset.
Third, our verification mechanism is also applicable to
non-image datasets, illustrated for the AG News dataset from
Figure 3j to Figure 3l. The undeleted users’ backdoor attack
accuracy is around 100% with a poison ratio greater than 10%,
while the deleted users’ backdoor attack accuracy stays around
25% (random guess accuracy). Specifically, for the AG News
classifier with a 30% poison ratio and 20 test samples, we
achieve β = 6.6× 10−16 with α = 10−5.
C. Results for the adaptive server
We choose the state-of-the-art backdoor defense method,
Neural Cleanse [25], for the adaptive server. Proposed by
Wang et al. [25], Neural Cleanse first reverse engineers the
backdoor triggers by searching for minimum input pertur-
bation needed for a target label classification, then uses the
reverse engineered backdoor trigger to poison certain samples
with correct labels to retrain the model for one step. We extend
this defense method to our setup where different users inject
different backdoors into the model. Specifically, the adaptive
server runs the Neural Cleanse defense method for individual
user’s data with the aim to make the backdoor injection
unsuccessful. We provide results only for the three image
datasets as Neural Cleanse needs gradient information with
regard to input samples for reverse engineering the backdoor
which is not available for the discrete AG News inputs.
First, the Neural Cleanse method greatly reduces the
backdoor attack success rate on the EMNIST MLP clas-
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sifiers. As shown in Figure 4a, the undeleted users’ backdoor
attack accuracy (p) is smaller than 40% when the poison
ratio is below 60%. Although greatly reduced after applying
the defense method, p is still significantly higher than q
(deleted users’ attack accuracy), especially with a high poison
ratio. Thus our verification can still have high confidence
performance with enough test samples. As shown later in
Section VI-D, when switching the model architecture to CNN,
the performance of Neural Cleanse is much worse and our
verification mechanism with the adaptive server succeeds.
Second, the Neural Cleanse method has limited defense
performance on more complex image datasets with more
complex model architectures. We show the accuracy perfor-
mance and verification performance for FEMNIST CNN and
CIFAR10 ResNet classifiers from Figure 4d to Figure 4i. On
the FEMNIST dataset, we still have undeleted users’ attack
accuracy above 90% when the poison ratio is greater than 30%,
where our verification mechanism achieves high confidence.
On the CIFAR10 dataset, we still have p value above 77% for
poison ratio between 30% and 50% with a decrease of clean
test accuracy smaller than 5%.
D. Performance with model complexity
We notice that the MLP model on the EMNIST dataset has
limited backdoor success in the presence of Neural Cleanse
[25], thus preventing our verification method to achieve as
high confidence as other image datasets. To explore the impact
of model complexity, we train a CNN classifier with the
same architecure as for FMNIST on the EMNIST dataset as
well. We first show the influence on the backdoor attacks
in Figure 5a, where we plot the backdoor success rate for
undeleted users with and without the backdoor defense. We
can clearly see that using the CNN with a larger model
(a) Backdoor attack accuracy for undeleted users.
(b) Verification performance for EMNIST classifiers. We fix the
poison ratio as 30% and α as 10−5.
Fig. 5: Performance on EMNIST dataset with two model
architectures (MLP and CNN).
complexity leads to higher backdoor success rate for undeleted
users (p), especially when the server uses Neural Cleanse [25]
for backdoor defense. The backdoor success for deleted users
stays around 0.1, and thus the CNN-based EMNIST classifiers
also have much better verification performance compared to
the MLP classifiers, as presented in Figure 5b.
VII. EVALUATING HETEROGENEITY ACROSS INDIVIDUAL
USERS
So far, our analysis on deletion verification performance is
evaluated based on the “average” backdoor attack accuracy p
across all undeleted users and the average backdoor attack
accuracy across all deleted users q. Next, we evaluate the
heterogeneity in the performance of stochastic deletion ver-
ification across individual users, to account for the variance
in individual users’ backdoor attack accuracy values. We find
that while most users are able to conclude correctly whether
their data has been deleted, a small subset of deleted users also
have high backdoor attack accuracy although the ML model
never trained on their backdoor triggers and target labels.
To quantify this effect, we present the cumulative distri-
bution plots for non-adaptive server over different datasets
in Figure 6, where we fix the poison ratio as 30%. Similar
results for the adaptive server are shown in the Appendix A.
We can see that except on the EMNIST classifier with Neural
Cleanse, almost all undeleted users have high backdoor attack
accuracy close to 100%. However, several deleted users
indeed have high backdoor attack accuracy for the image
classifiers. For example, for the CIFAR10 classifier with non-
adaptive server, 5 out of 100 deleted users have backdoor
attack accuracy higher than 80%. We think the reason is that
there are one or more undeleted users with similar backdoor
triggers and the same target labels as those rare deleted users,
resulting in their high backdoor attack accuracy without their
data being used in the training set of the ML model. In
fact, popular image classification architectures, such as CNN
and ResNet, are trained to behave similarly for images with
rotation, translation, and transformation, leading to behave
similarly on similar triggers.
For the AG News dataset, we rarely observe deleted
users with high backdoor attack accuracy: only 2 out of 116
deleted users have backdoor attack accuracy slightly higher
than 50%, while all except one undeleted users have backdoor
attack accuracy higher than 66%. Compared to image datasets,
our backdoor triggers (random word list) on the AG News
dataset are very different across different users.
For image classifiers, on those deleted users with high back-
door attack accuracy, our verification mechanism is likely to
wrongly blame the server for not deleting the data. To resolve
this issue, we propose that multiple users cooperate with each
other by sharing their estimated backdoor success rates and
thereby achieve high confidence verification. Specifically, we
decide based on the lowest success rate among all collaborat-
ing users, given that the scenario H1 is incorrectly inferred
when multiple deleted user report high backdoor success rate.
However, this occurs with low probability. In contrast, for the
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(a) EMNIST (b) FEMNIST (c) CIFAR10 (d) AG News
Fig. 6: The CDFs of backdoor attack accuracy for deleted and undeleted users for different datasets (poison ratio 30%).
TABLE III: The likelihood of β ≥ 0.01 given single/multiple
users jointly run the hypothesis testing. Note that this il-
lustrates a conservative worst-case analysis, and the results
are strictly better for the average case. As can be seen, the
likelihood sharply reduces when two or more users collaborate
for machine unlearning verification. We use 20 samples and
set the poison ratio as 30%, α equal to 10−5.
model single user 2 users 3 users 4 users 5 users
EMNIST 1.1× 10−1 2.1× 10−2 8× 10−3 3× 10−3 2× 10−3
FEMNIST 9.2× 10−2 8× 10−3 7× 10−4 7× 10−5 8× 10−6
CIFAR10 7.9× 10−2 8× 10−3 8× 10−4 9× 10−5 9× 10−6
correct hypothesis H1, all undeleted users typically report high
backdoor success rates with high probability. We illustrate the
effectiveness of this cooperative strategy among users in Table
III, where different columns show the worst-case probability
of β ≥ 0.01 with varying numbers of cooperative users. Note
that by increasing the number of cooperative users by 1, the
worst-case probability falls by one order of magnitude.
To further make our verification mechanism more reliable,
we can also use multiple backdoor triggers with multiple target
labels for one user and estimate the lowest backdoor success
rate among all triggers. As long as the deleted user has one
trigger leading to low attack accuracy, we can obtain reliable
performance from a worst-case perspective. Another direction
is to combine our method with other verification methods, such
as user-level membership inference attacks to detect whether
a user’s data was used to train the ML model or not [32]. We
leave this as future work.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Number of Users Sustainable
Given the finite space of backdoor patterns, one or more
users can choose similar (similar and not exact because the ML
algorithms are robust to small deviations) backdoors which can
be a source of inaccuracies. It is important to have bounds
on how many users can our mechanism sustain before such
collisions start hampering the overall system performance.
For ease of exposition, we consider the domain of image
classification. Let us consider a setting with binary images of
size n, each backdoor has w pixels set, and define dissimilar
backdoors to be backdoors that differ in at least d values. For
instance, in our backdoor, when using EMNIST dataset, each
image is n = 784 = 28 × 28, we have set w = 4 pixels and
d = 2 (i.e., if two backdoors share 3 of the 4 pixels, they
interfere with each others classification). We want to answer
the following question:
How many backdoor patterns exist that are suffi-
ciently dissimilar to each other?
This can be answered by an exact mapping to the follow-
ing problem in coding theory: find the maximal number of
binary vectors of length n, hamming distance d apart, with
constant weight w. Exactly computing this quantity, denoted
by A(n, d, w), is an open research question but there exist a
number of bounds in the literature (Chapter 17 in MacWilliams
and Sloane [40]). In our study, we need to compute the
quantity:
#Backdoors =
n∑
i=d
A(n, i, w) (13)
where the summation is because backdoors can differ arbi-
trarily as long as they are sufficiently dissimilar. Theorem 7
from [40] provides exact values for simple cases such as those
required in our EMNIST example. We can then use a simple
birthday paradox analysis to bound the number of users in the
system to ensure low probability of backdoor collision. Note
that the above analysis becomes more involved when using
Convolutional Neural Networks as the convolution layers treat
neighboring pixels with the same filter weight.
B. Usefulness of our mechanism on the server side
Besides leveraging the backdoor attacks for deletion veri-
fication at the user side, our approach also provides benefits
to an honest server. First, the server can use our method to
validate that their data deletion pipeline is bug-free. In cases
where the MLaaS providers do not want backdoors in their ML
models, such backdoor-based verification mechanism can be
applied in production by setting the target backdoor labels to a
specific “outlier” label, which is not used for future prediction.
Second, the server can use our backdoor-based mechanism
to quantitatively measure the effectiveness of recently
proposed deletion approaches without strict deletion guar-
antees, such as [10, 11]. These approaches directly update
the model parameters to remove the impact of the deleted
data without retraining the model. Our framework can be an
efficient way to evaluate their performance.
C. Other backdoor attacks and defenses
The contribution of our paper is to use backdoor attacks
for probabilistic verification of machine unlearning. Our veri-
fication mechanism can be easily extended to other backdoor
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attack methods [14, 23, 24]. When testing the verification per-
formance under a strategic malicious server, we use the state-
of-the-art backdoor defense method, Neural Cleanse [25], to
train the ML model. We find that Neural Cleanse only has a
limited impact of our verification approach: undeleted users
still have much higher backdoor success rate than the deleted
users, and our verification mechanism still works well. Several
new defense approaches have also been proposed recently
[29, 31]. Veldanda et al. [31] showed that the defense method
proposed by Liu et al. [29] is ineffective against adaptive
backdoor attacks, and their proposed defence came out last
month. However, unless they fully mitigate backdoor issues in
the multi-user setting, our verification method is still useful.
If the malicious adversary finds a perfect defense method
to fully mitigate the backdoor attacks, then our verification
approach will not work, but a user can become aware of this
scenario by observing a low backdoor attack accuracy before
the deletion request. In this scenario, the user could either find
stealthier backdoor attacks [22, 24], or use alternative verifi-
cation methods, such as membership inference attacks [32].
IX. RELATED WORK
A. Existing Machine Unlearning Approaches
The simple approach of just deleting data as requested by
users and retraining the model from scratch is inefficient in
case of large datasets and models with high complexities.
Therefore, Cao and Yang [7] applied ideas from statistical
query learning [41] and train the model based on intermediate
summations of training data. Upon deletion request, they
update the summations which is significantly more efficient.
However, their method is only applicable to conventional
machine learning models. Ginart et al. [8] proposed two
provably efficient mechanisms for k-means clustering by either
quantizing centroids at each iteration or using a divide-and-
conquer algorithm to recursively partition the training set into
subsets. Concurrently, Garg et al. [42] explore the related but
orthogonal problem of what it means to delete user data from
a theoretical viewpoint.
Bourtoule et al. [9] proposed to split the training set into
disjoint shards, train local models separately on every shard,
and aggregate outputs from all local models to obtain the final
prediction. By splitting data into disjoint shards, only one or
few local models need to be retrained for deletion requests.
Other methods aim to update model parameters to remove
the impact of the deleted data on the model. Guo et al.
[10] defined data deletion as an indistinguishability problem:
similar to differential privacy [43], for a deletion request, the
updated model with their approach should be difficult to distin-
guish from the model retrained from scratch by removing the
deleted samples. Specifically, Guo et al. leverage the influence
function [44] of the deleted training point to apply a one-step
Newton update on model parameters. Baumhauer et al. [11]
focused on the setting where the deletion request is to remove
an entire class. They design a linear transformation layer
appended to the model for class deletion request. However,
there is no guarantee that no information of the deleted class
is left inside the updated model.
B. Verifying Machine Unlearning
One approach is the use of verifiable computation. Such
techniques can enable data-owners to attest the MLaaS
provider’s processing steps and thus verify that the data is truly
being deleted. Possible techniques include the use of secure
processors [45], trusted platform modules [46, 47], and zero-
knowledge proofs [48, 49]. However, such techniques require
assumptions that limit their practicality – server side computa-
tion, the use of trusted parties, computational overhead along
with frequent attacks on the security of such systems [50, 51].
Moreover, as these schemes require detailed insight into the
computation process, frequently, the service provider cannot
keep the model a secret, which is a serious limitation.
Shokri et al. [2] investigated membership inference attacks
in machine learning, where the adversary goal is to guess
whether a sample is in the target model’s training set. They
train shadow models on auxiliary data to mimic the target
model and then train a classifier for inference attacks. Song
et al. [32] extended the record-level membership inference
to user-level membership inference attacks that determines
whether a user’s data was used to train the target model.
To apply these methods to our setup, each user needs to
train shadow models on an auxiliary datasets similar to the
target model, including knowledge of the target model’s
architecture and computation capability. In comparison, our
backdoor-based machine unlearning verification approach does
not require those strong assumptions and obtains extreme good
verification performance.
Recently, Sablayrolles et al. [52] proposed a method to
detect whether a particular image dataset has been used to
train a model by adding well-designed perturbations that alters
their extracted features and thereby watermarking the model.
Instead of tracing an entire dataset, our approach considers a
multi-user setting where each user adds a personal backdoor
for future machine unlearning verification. Also, they only
consider image datasets. Finally, Adi et al. used backdoor
attacks to watermark deep learning models [53].
X. CONCLUSION
The right to be forgotten addresses an increasingly pressing
concern in the digital age. While there are several regulations
and interpretations of the legal status of this right, there are
few concrete approaches to study data deletion. In this paper,
we formally examine probabilistic verification of machine
unlearning and provide concrete quantitative measures to study
this from an individual user perspective. Based on backdoor
attacks, we propose a mechanism by which users can verify,
with high confidence, the compliance/incompliance of service
providers of their right to be forgotten. We provide extensive
evaluation of our proposed verification mechanism over a
range of network architectures and datasets. Overall, this
work provides a mathematical foundation for a quantitative
verification of machine unlearning.
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APPENDIX
A. Analyzing Heterogeneity across Individual Users for the
Adaptive Server
Similar to Section VII, here we focus on the heterogeneity
in performance across individual users when the adaptive
server uses Neural Cleanse [25] to defend against backdoor
attacks. We present the performance heterogeneity across
individual users by presenting the cumulative distributions of
their backdoor success rate in Figure 7.
(a) EMNIST
(b) FEMNIST
(c) CIFAR10
Fig. 7: The CDFs of backdoor attack accuracy for deleted and
undeleted users for different datasets in the presence of an
adaptive server (poison ratio 30%).
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